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I. INTRODUCTION
The field of law and socioeconomics studies the interrelationship
between law and economic/social processes. It not only critiques
neoclassical economics, but draws on alternative economic approaches
and the other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology,
anthropology, and political science, for the tools of public policy
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1975. This Article is based on my presentations given at the Association of
American Law Schools 2003 Annual Meeting, Law and Economics Session, and at the
25th Anniversary National Association of Women Judges 2003 Annual Conference,
October 8, 2003, and on my article, Lynne L. Dallas, Law and Socioeconomics in Legal
Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855 (2003).
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analysis. It offers students an interdisciplinary, values-based approach
to public policy that is designed to take into account the power
implications and distributional effects of laws. Law and socioeconomics
stresses the importance to effective regulation of attention to historical
context, philosophical beliefs, culture, existing institutions, working
rules, and sources of power. The alternative economic approaches that it
encompasses include behavioral, neo-institutional, feminist, binary, neoMarxist, traditional institutional, and post-Keynesian economics. These
heterodox economic approaches are united in that they disagree with one
or more aspects of neoclassical economics.1
This Article, in Part II, gives a brief introduction to socioeconomics
and its relevance to law. Part III presents an overview of what a law and
socioeconomics course may look like, based on materials in my textbook,
Law and Public Policy: A Socioeconomic Approach.2 Part IV presents in
more detail exploration of materials included in a segment of the course.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOECONOMICS AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO LAW
The legal academy has been mainly exposed to neoclassical
economics. Many teachers are not aware of the limitations of this
approach or of alternative schools of economic thought (hereinafter
referred to as socioeconomics) that criticize neoclassical economics and
offer alternative perspectives. I provide a brief introduction to law and
1. For discussions of the meaning of socioeconomics, see ROBERT A. SOLO,
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS v–vii (2000); Richard M. Coughlin,
Introduction: Toward an Agenda for Socio-Economics, in MORALITY, RATIONALITY, AND
EFFICIENCY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIO-ECONOMICS 3, 4–5 (Richard M. Coughlin ed.,
1991); Richard M. Coughlin, Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interests? SocioEconomics and Communitarian Perspectives, 25 J. SOCIO-ECON. 135, 136–37 (1996);
Amitai Etzioni, Socio-Economics: A Budding Challenge, in SOCIO-ECONOMICS: TOWARD
A NEW SYNTHESIS 3, 4 (Amitai Etzioni & Paul R. Lawrence eds., 1991); Richard
Hattwick, The Future Paradigm for Socio-Economics: Three Visions and a Call for
Papers, 28 J. SOCIO-ECON. 511, 511 (1999); Paul C. Stern, The Socio-Economic
Perspective and Its Institutional Prospects, 22 J. SOCIO-ECON. 1, 1 (1993); Charles J.
Whalen, Preface to POLITICAL ECONOMY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: CONTEMPORARY
VIEWS ON THE TREND OF ECONOMICS xv, xv (Charles J. Whalen ed., 1996). For
discussions of law and socioeconomics, see LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY:
A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH (forthcoming Spring 2004); Robert Ashford, SocioEconomics: What Is Its Place in Law Practice?, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 611, 611, 614–15;
Robert Ashford, The Socio-Economic Foundation of Corporate Law and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2002); Lynne L. Dallas, Law and
Socioeconomics in Legal Education, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 855, 855–57 (2003); Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Law and Socioeconomics, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 224, 224–25 (1999); Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Teaching Contracts from a Socioeconomic Perspective, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1233, 1233–36 (2000).
2. DALLAS, supra note 1. This textbook is forthcoming from the Carolina Academic
Press in Spring 2004.
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socioeconomics, in this Part, by considering concepts used by neoclassical
economists and socioeconomists and their relevance to law.
A. Conceptions of Markets
From the socioeconomic perspective, markets are “social construction.”3
“Consumption, production and distribution of income [are] determined
in [the] context of legal/institutional environment, social norms, customs
and rules, market power, corporate power, bargaining power, class, race,
gender, and other forms of discrimination.”4 From the neoclassical
perspective, markets are “natural” and “private.”5 “Persons exercising
individual choice determine consumption, production and distribution of
income.”6
What is the relevance of these concepts for the role of law? Reliance
is often placed on the self-regulatory nature of markets when markets are
perceived as natural and private. In addition, for the autonomous and
self-sufficient actors exercising free choice in these markets, law is
designed to ensure the enforcement of contracts and possibly to regulate
fraud.7
In contrast, when markets are social constructions, the role of law is
broadened.8 The law may seek to influence social norms, for example.
This role refers to the expressive function of law, where law is designed
not only to affect incentives based on rational cost-benefit analyses, but
to influence the very values that persons internalize in making choices.9
Understanding markets and choice as embedded in a social milieu also
emphasizes the interdependence of economic actors and how the
behavior and choices of some people affect the opportunity sets of
others.10 If actors are interdependent, the law’s role becomes to manage
relationships to assure fairness in terms of the opportunities available to
various actors and the distribution of entitlements. For example, the law
may prohibit discrimination on the basis of invidious distinctions, such
as race, gender, and sexual orientation.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Dallas, supra note 1, at 858.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 859–60.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 858.
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B. Conceptions of Economics as a Discipline
To law and socioeconomic scholars, economics is a study of
“provisioning,” that is, “how societies provide for the well-being of their
members.”11 It is a study of economics in relation to culture and history
and is process-oriented and evolutionary.12 The economy is viewed as
the result of “a complex historical process that is ever evolving and
whose future is influenced by the past although not wholly determined
by it.”13 In contrast, neoclassical economists understand economics to
be a “[t]heory of choice and how scarce resources are allocated to satisfy
unlimited human wants.”14 They use a timeless microeconomic model
to make their predictions.15
To understand the differences, consider the neoclassical economic
model, which predicts that wages result from the intersection of labor
demand and supply curves and reflect the marginal productivity of
individuals or, according to the statistical discrimination theory, the
marginal productivity of groups.16 In contrast, socioeconomists claim
that wage discrimination does not necessarily reflect productivity
differences, but rests on historical legacies and culture that result in
differential assessments of worth, often based on stereotyping.17
Supportive of this view is the failure of human capital theory to explain
away economic discrimination based on productivity differences.18 In
addition, socioeconomists claim that wage discrimination is, in some
cases, based on fairness considerations.19 This observation explains, for
example, inter-industry wage differentials for similar jobs.20 The
different economic approaches to economics as a discipline support
different legal prescriptions.
Consider another example of the different approaches to economics as
a discipline in the context of market reform in Russia. Based on the insights
of neoclassical economists, the Washington Consensus developed to
advise “shock therapy,” which refers to the rapid liberalization of
markets in Russia and the privatization of enterprises.21 This advice was
11. Id. at 891.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (Discrimination), ch. 9 (Families, Markets and
the Law).
17. Id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination).
18. Id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination), ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law).
19. Id. at ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law).
20. Id.
21. Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1739 (2000); see Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither
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followed based on the predictions that new property owners would have
incentives to maximize the value of their corporations and that the
market would inflict economic discipline. What transpired was very different,
however, and confirmed the warnings of the evolutionary-institutional
economic approach.22 There was wholesale looting of Russian enterprises
with devastating consequences to the economy and the Russian people.
Per capita gross domestic product declined by forty percent, persons in
poverty grew from a fraction of the population to thirty-seven percent,
and the average life span of the population declined.23 This was truly a
story of human tragedy that was predicted by the evolutionary-institutional
economic approach, but came as surprise to neoclassical economists who
relied on their timeless model in a real world setting.24
A final example of the different approaches to economics as a
discipline involves a research project in which I was asked by a Slovene
scholar to evaluate Slovenia’s recently-adopted employee codetermination
system of corporate governance. In this system, employees as well as
shareholders elect directors to the supervisory board of a two-tiered
board system.25 I did not adopt a one-size-fits-all model based on the
theoretical arguments of neoclassical economic scholars who reject
stakeholder theory and argue in favor of shareholder representation on
corporate boards to achieve the “efficient” objective of maximizing
profit and shareholder gain.26
In contrast, I took an institutional-evolutionary economic approach. I
explored why employee codetermination had been adopted in Slovenia.
What functions did it serve as Slovenia was emerging as a market
economy? I found a number of reasons why employee codetermination
was effective in the historical context in which Slovenia found itself.
For example, Slovenia was unique among Eastern European countries in
having a history of employee self-management of state-owned
Reform? Ten Years of the Transition, Keynote Address at the World Bank Annual Bank
Conference on Development Economics (Apr. 28–30, 1999), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/research/abcde/pdfs/stiglitz.pdf.
22. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 12 (Emerging Market Economies).
23. Black et al., supra note 21, at 1780–81; John Peters et al., Economic Transition
as a Crisis of Vision: Classical Versus Neoclassical Theories of General Equilibrium, 28
E. ECON. J. 217, 227 (2002).
24. Black et al., supra note 21, at 1733, 1767–77, 1797.
25. Lynne L. Dallas, The Evolutionary-Institutional Approach to Corporate
Governance: The Case of Slovenia (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
26. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 10 (Corporate Social Responsibility, Markets and
the Law).
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enterprises.27 Employee codetermination provided a mechanism to
gradually introduce a governance system in which shareholders also
played a part. In addition, for Slovene corporations to become competitive,
it was necessary for the employees to make sacrifices in terms of wages
and benefits.28 Codetermination provided employees with some assurance
that they would share in the future rewards that these sacrifices would
entail. Therefore, it was easier to institute these changes without undue
discontent and adverse motivational effects. It was also the case that
many of the shares in Slovene corporations were to be owned by
Slovene political entities and investment companies associated with
political parties.29 In this context, employee representation provided a
counterweight to the exercise of political authority within Slovene
corporations. Additionally, the two-tiered board structure, which provides
for a separate management board, would serve to discourage political
interference into the day-to-day management of the corporation.30
Slovene corporations also did a substantial amount of trade with
Germany and expected this trade to increase.31 They sought to make
their corporations compatible with German corporations that have
Finally, emerging from communism, employee
codetermination.32
codetermination—rather than shareholder wealth maximization—was a
system of corporate governance that Slovenians were prepared to accept
based on the values that they held.33 In this research I was reminded of a
statement by Philip Mirowski, an institutional economist, who explains
that:
[t]he economy is primarily a process of learning, negotiation, and coordination,
and not a ratification of some pre-existent goals or end-state. Economic
rationality is socially and culturally determined. . . . The economy itself may be
conceptualized as the prosecution of inquiry by material means, with the
community both constructing and discovering its values.34

C. Conceptions of Economic Actors
Another area of difference between law and socioeconomics and law
and neoclassical economics involves assumptions of human behavior.
Neoclassical economics is based on assumptions that people are self27. Dallas, supra note 25.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Dallas, supra note 1, at 861 (quoting Philip Mirowski, The Philosophical Basis
of Institutional Economics, in 1 EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 51, 69 (Marc R. Tool ed.,
1988)).
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interested and rational.35 Socioeconomists challenge these assumptions.36
First, consider the self-interested assumption. In my law and socioeconomics
class I have students play the ultimatum game. In this game:
one student assumes the role of an allocator and decides what part of a dollar he
or she is willing to offer to another student, the recipient. The recipient may
accept the offer, in which case both players receive the amounts allocated. If the
recipient rejects the offer, however, neither player receives anything.37

Based on assumptions of the rational actor, neoclassical economists
predict that recipients will accept any offer above zero.38 In reality,
many recipients will accept only offers for higher amounts that they
deem “fair.”39
This finding concerning the importance of fairness is relevant to the
law. People are concerned about outcomes, but also about fairness.40
When people are treated in a procedurally fair manner, they will accept
adverse outcomes and comply with them more readily than people who
perceive the procedure to be unfair.41 For example, a study of civil
litigation in federal courts found that there was a strong relationship
between litigants’ judgments of procedural fairness and their acceptance
of arbitration awards.42 Moreover, judgments of procedural fairness
were found to relate to the acceptance of the legitimacy of authorities,
and these perceptions of legitimacy were related to greater legal
compliance.43
In addition to challenging the assumption of self-interest, the rationality
assumption has also been challenged by law and socioeconomic scholars.44
The law reviews now contain numerous articles that explore the
significance to various areas of law of bounded rationality, cognitive
biases, and heuristics.45 Illustrative are articles on discrimination, which
35. Dallas, supra note 1, at 862.
36. Id. at 864–68.
37. Id. at 864–65 (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 865.
39. Id.
40. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being), ch. 4
(Fairness and Legal Socialization).
41. Id. at ch. 4 (Fairness and Legal Socialization) (citing Raymond Paternoster et
al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse Assault, 31
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163, 167–71 (1997)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Dallas, supra note 1, at 866–68.
45. See DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (Law and Cognitive Psychology) (exploring
findings of cognitive psychology that suggest alternate legal rules and procedures).
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point out the adverse effects of categorizing and stereotyping people by
race, gender, and other social characteristics. Cognitive psychologists
explain findings relevant to the employment context: (1) persons
disproportionately attribute ingroup members’ failures to situational or
circumstantial factors and outgroup members’ failures to dispositional or
character traits; (2) persons are better able to recall the undesirable
behavior of outgroup members than the similar undesirable behavior of
ingroup members; and (3) persons have a more negative reaction to the
problematic behavior of a token or “solo” than to the problematic
behavior of a person who is not a token.46 All of these biases affect
employment and promotion decisions and are important for lawmakers
to understand if they are concerned about discrimination.
D. Interpersonal Utility Comparisons and Conceptions
of Well-Being
Law and neoclassical economic scholars will not make interpersonal
utility comparisons.47 That is, a dollar is taken to mean the same to all
persons. A dollar used for food to survive is equivalent to a dollar used
to buy diamonds.48 This position is contrary to that of economists in the
past who believed in the declining utility of the dollar as a person’s
wealth increased.49 In addition, many socioeconomists maintain the
feasibility of ascertaining objective and universal needs.50 Institutional
economist Geoffrey Hodgson claims that rational discourse is possible
on the subject of human needs, given the human condition and context.51
Moreover, feminist economist Paula England believes that persons are
capable of empathy, which enables them to make interpersonal utility
comparisons.52 To socioeconomists, social welfare analysis requires
consideration of the extent to which human needs are satisfied.53 This
analysis includes considerations of social and economic rights and
distributional concerns.
Law and socioeconomic scholars also consider both hedonic and
eudaimonic well-being.54 That is, their focus is not simply on maximizing
46. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 7 (Discrimination) (citing Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1192, 1194–95 (1995)).
47. Dallas, supra note 1, at 881.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 881–82.
50. Id. at 882.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being).
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pleasure versus pain, but also on considering the psychological conditions
necessary for psychological well-being and human actualization.
E. Approaches to Legal Regulation
Law and neoclassical economic scholars apply economics to seek
“efficient” laws. In some situations they recommend that markets should
allocate property. The popular version of the Coase Theorem, for example,
provides that private parties acting in their own self-interest will allocate
property through their contracts so that this property will be put to its
most efficient use.55 However, if a market solution is not readily apparent,
law and neoclassical economic scholars seek to have courts “mimic” the
market.56 One such method is embraced by their hypothetical bargaining
model.57 According to this method, courts must hypothesize bargaining
among the parties and come up with a solution based on this hypothetical
bargaining. In addition, they recommend that choices of laws and public
projects be based on cost-benefit analysis.58 The solutions reached by
these methods are deemed to be “efficient.”59 Efficiency is understood
as a state that maximizes social welfare and that is neutral or indifferent
as to the distribution of wealth.60
Law and socioeconomists question whether social welfare is maximized
when there are great disparities in wealth.61 To law and neoclassical
economists, there is no difference, from an efficiency perspective,
whether ninety percent of the wealth is owned by ten percent of the
population or by ninety percent of the population.62 This makes a difference
to law and socioeconomists. They are concerned with distribution.63 They
ask the additional questions of efficient for whom and at what cost to
others.
Institutional economists also point out that prices are not neutral but
rights specific. That is, prices “reflect the property regime under which
the commodities are produced and traded.”64 In other words, “laws that
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Dallas, supra note 1, at 893.
Id. at 872.
DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being).
Dallas, supra note 1, at 884.
Id. at 876–77, 884.
Id. at 877, 879.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 877–78.
Id. at 878.
Id.
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affect entitlements determine demand and supply curves, prices and
costs. Thus, ‘efficiency is a function of existing rights’ and it is ‘circular
to maintain that efficiency alone can determine rights.’”65 Trading
reflects the “normative distributive premises underlying the existing
legal regime.”66 The recommendation of mimicking the market, therefore,
begs the question of which market we are talking about. There is not
one market, but as many markets as different legal rules can create.
Consider, for example, the problem used to describe the Coase Theorem
with the court allocating property rights to the cattleman. The price at
which the farmer is willing to purchase the land from the cattleman and
the cattleman is willing to accept is determined by a slew of regulations
applicable to farming, grazing, and food products.
The market mimicking solution is even more unhelpful when one
takes into account the endowment effect.67 Behavioral economists have
found that the price people are willing to pay if they do not own the
property is less than the price that they are willing to accept for the
property if they own it.68 Ownership matters then to the valuation of
property. This behavioral finding further supports the conclusion that
market trading or “efficiency” is dependent on existing entitlements.
Cost-benefit analysis as a tool of public policy analysis suffers from
the same problems of valuation.69 It is important to recognize the normative
assumptions underlying prices and rules used in cost-benefit analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis is not a neutral tool of public policy analysis, but
necessarily makes value judgments.70
Finally, the hypothetical bargaining model is also problematic. As
previously explained, it asks the court to determine what the parties
would have bargained for if they could have foreseen the problem
confronting the court. DeMott captures the problems with this model.
She states the following:
[T]he “hypothetical bargain” view of fiduciary obligation does not help to
explain the law. For one thing, how hypothetical is the bargain? If it is an
approximation of something that particular parties would have agreed to, the
content of the bargain will, like actual bargains, reflect many factors, including
the scarcity of the subject matter of the bargain, the parties’ relative skills in
negotiation, and their relative degrees of aversion to risks of varied sorts. In the
absence of an actual bargain, one cannot know the import of each of these
factors. On the other hand, if the “hypothetical bargain” represented by
fiduciary obligation is truly hypothetical, and not an approximation of what
65. Id. (quoting NICOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 118 (1997)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 868.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 885.
70. Id. at 885–87.
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particular parties would have agreed to, why characterize it as a “bargain” at
all? In this respect, the metaphor of the hypothetical bargain is like the Wizard
of Oz. Behind the curtain is less than appearances might suggest.71

F. The Invisible Hand of Adam Smith
Finally, I will comment on the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith, which
is at the heart of neoclassical market analysis. Studies of the prisoners’
dilemma game show that persons pursuing their individual self-interest
often obtain outcomes that are not in their self-interest.72 These findings
are contrary to Adam Smith’s invisible hand, whereby individuals
pursuing their self-interest are expected to unintendedly maximize social
welfare.73 For example, the invisible hand of Adam Smith is the basis of
neoclassical economic arguments in favor of trade liberalization. While
this complex topic is beyond the scope of this Article, two observations
are in order. The first is that Adam Smith was writing at a time when
capital was not mobile as it is today.74 Daly and Cobb write:
Consider . . . how the system is supposed to work. When enhanced
productivity displaces workers in one area, the profits generated thereby are
invested in something else. New jobs are created. The workers move to this
new industry. The economy as a whole advances.
But when investment capital becomes supranational, there is no assurance
that the new investment will be in the country where the jobs are lost. Indeed,
acting on individualistic economic principles unencumbered by community,
investors seek the best return on their money. A factory employing docile and
cheap labor that can export its products to the American market from abroad
will be more profitable than one built in the United States. Labor-intensive
industry will naturally move to countries where labor is cheaper. Wages will
decline in countries where capital investment is reduced.75

Thus, the invisible hand does not work from a national perspective if

71. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being) (quoting
Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 889–90) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at ch 6 (Cooperation, Trust and the Law) (quoting Robert M. Axelrod &
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Evolution of Cooperation, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 80–84 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds.,
1994)).
73. Id. at ch. 11 (Globalization: A Revisionist Approach) (quoting HERMAN E.
DALY & JOHN COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD: REDIRECTING THE ECONOMY TOWARD
COMMUNITY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 209–23, 226–27 (2d ed.
1994)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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capital is mobile. Actually, Adam Smith understood this fact.76
The second observation is of the collective action problem presented
by Daly and Cobb. They explain:
Consider . . . a U.S. Firm that moves its production across the Rio Grande
into Mexico. It lays off U.S. workers earning 10 to 12 dollars per hour and
hires Mexican workers at less than two dollars per hour. The U.S. capitalistowner is much better off, the Mexican workers are slightly better off, and the
U.S. worker is much worse off. . . . [The U.S. firm acting in its individual selfinterest] wants to buy labor in the low-income country, and sell its product in
the high-income country. It wants to take advantage of high incomes in the
U.S. product market while failing to contribute to the maintenance of that highincome market by buying labor in the U.S. factors markets.77

While it is in the collective interest then of such firms to maintain a rich
consumers market in the United States, it is not in their individual
interest to do so. Again, the invisible hand of Adam Smith fails to deal
the cards predicted.
G. Two Further Examples
Consider two further illustrations contrasting law and socioeconomics
and law and neoclassical economics, one in legal scholarship and one in
teaching. Concerning legal scholarship, I recently completed an article
on corporate ethical climates.78 I believe that a law and neoclassical
economic scholar exploring this subject would focus mainly on incentives
that would encourage a person to act ethically, such as monitoring
systems and punishments for unethical conduct. In contrast, from a law
and socioeconomic perspective, I also focused on factors that would
encourage employees to internalize ethical values, such as the organization’s
values, its decisionmaking procedures, certain compensation systems,
and organizational leadership.
An illustration of different approaches to teaching involves the Baby
M case,79 which I cover in my law and socioeconomics seminar. In that
case the surrogate mother did not want to give the child to the natural
father and his wife. A student after class told me that her contracts class
had discussed the Baby M case, and the conclusion was that the contract
should be enforced because, after all, the parties were adults, and the
procedure was initiated by the father, who intended to care for the child
after birth. However, unlike the contracts class, I assigned contextual
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2003).
79. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
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material to students. This material contained information on the surrogacy
industry and motivations of surrogate mothers.
According to Anderson, women who are motivated purely by money
are often rejected by the surrogacy industry.80 It selects women based on
traits of submissiveness and emphasizes motives of generosity and love
in giving a baby to a childless couple.81 The industry stresses the surrogate
mother’s altruistic motives should she object to contract terms.82
Many women become surrogate mothers believing that surrogacy will
fulfill some emotional need, which is unlikely to happen.83 For example,
many of them wish to feel special and appreciated and desire emotional
support and personal connections.84 Of course, most adoptive parents
want the baby and to have nothing to do with the birth mother.85
After separating from the baby, most surrogate mothers have
emotional issues, some quite serious.86 The women have no idea in
advance of the psychological attachment that they may develop to the
child, although this is well known in the surrogacy industry. While this
emotional fallout is predictable, these contracts do not contain provisions
for therapy for the surrogate mother after separating from the child, but
often contain provisions that require the surrogate mother to do “emotional
labor” in suppressing the development of feelings of parental love.87
The industry refers to these mothers as “hatcheries,” “plumbing,”
“rented property,” or “surrogate uteruses.”88 This dehumanization
obviously serves the purpose of making it easier for employees to deflect
and belittle the expected emotions of these women.
There are also societal issues involved in enforcing these contracts
that concern the effects of commodifying babies and pricing them. It
may change norms and the ways parents view their children and children
see themselves.89 Children are affected. For example, children of some

80. DALLAS, supra note 1, at ch. 8 (The Domain of Markets) (citing ELIZABETH
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 169–72, 174–81, 185–89 (1993)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (stating that motives also include punishing oneself for a prior abortion and
coming to terms with emotions associated with losing another child in the past).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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surrogate mothers have expressed fears that they too will be sold and
feel they have lost a brother or sister when the surrogate mother gives up
the baby.90
In addition, there is the issue of introducing the profit motive in such a
sensitive area fraught with emotions. The intermediary used in the Baby
M case, for example, failed to disclose to the adoptive parents and the
surrogate mother the results of the surrogate mother’s psychological test,
which was part of the procedures agreed to.91 The psychologist reported
that the surrogate mother, Ms. Whitehead, exhibited traits that indicated
she would have a difficult time separating from the baby and that further
testing should be done.92 No further testing was done.93 In fact, Ms.
Whitehead could not separate from her baby and took the baby out of
the state.94
Finally, there are issues associated with having a production system
for babies. Will we see baby farms? What if the market should dry
up—should we have liquidation sales for babies? Also, there is the issue
of the slippery slope: why not have a market for older children as well?
After considering these issues, the student was not so sure that
surrogacy contracts should be enforced and appreciated the complexity
of this public policy issue, which is not clearly reducible to a simple
ideology connecting autonomy with enforcing contracts among adults.
III. THE SCOPE OF LAW AND SOCIOECONOMICS COURSES
I present in this Part the subjects that I selected to include in my
textbook on law and socioeconomics. There are many other subjects that
teachers may wish to pursue. This discussion, however, is intended to give
a good overview of what a course on law and socioeconomics may look like.
A law and socioeconomics course might profitably begin with an
introduction that compares law and socioeconomics with law and
neoclassical economics in terms of perceptions of markets, economics as
a discipline, assumptions concerning human behavior, methodologies,
and legal analysis.95 These comparisons may provide a conceptual
framework for the course that students can follow. Introductory material
may also include an institutional and behavioral critique of neoclassical
“efficiency” concepts and present the Coase Theorem and an

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

24

Id.
Id. (quoting In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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institutional and behavioral critique of it.96
In my view, the course should include, early in the semester, material
from the vast law and behavioral economics literature that challenges the
rationality assumption of neoclassical economics.97 This material will
permit students to consider the relevance to law that humans are
boundedly rational, use heuristics, and are prone to systematic biases in
their decisionmaking.
I also believe that the course should give attention to distributive
fairness concepts as well as human well-being paradigms and their
relevance to the law.98 Students may explore the relevance of economic
fairness to legal and business decisionmaking and the relationships
between social and economic rights and well-being paradigms.99
In addition, the course may consider factors that lead to perceptions of
the legitimacy of legal authority and compliance with the law. This
discussion may refer to materials on procedural fairness and on
socialization and internalization processes as suggested by social
learning and moral development theories.100 Students may particularly
find of interest materials on the impact of legal education on moral
orientation and on the relationship between moral orientation and
judicial decisionmaking.101
Flowing logically from the consideration of internalization processes,
a course may address the nature of norms and the reasons they are
followed.102 Students may also consider the interrelationships between
law and norms, and explore questions such as the following: Should
judicial decisionmaking take into account norms? What role should
custom play in legal decisionmaking? Is there an expressive function of
laws? Do laws change norms, and if so, should legal regulation be
designed to serve this function?103
A law and socioeconomics course may also profitably explore trust
and cooperation because they are important to the law and economic
life.104 Discussions may address the possible motivations and conditions
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at ch. 1 apps. A & B.
See id. at ch. 2 (Law and Cognitive Psychology).
See id. at ch. 3 (Economic Fairness and Well-Being).
See id.
See id. at ch. 4 (Fairness and Legal Socialization).
See id.
See id. at ch. 5 (Culture, Norms and the Law).
See id.
See id. at ch. 6 (Cooperation, Trust and the Law).
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for cooperation, the neoclassical and socioeconomic meanings of trust,
and the relationship between altruism and selfishness and contract law
and fiduciary duty law.105
As discussed in more detail in Part IV of this Article, the course may
also examine the subject of discrimination by considering the perspectives
of alternative schools of economic thought and the findings of
psychologists concerning stereotyping.106 Relevant issues that may be
explored include whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should exist, the
theories for including certain groups under the Act, and the advisability
of affirmative action policies and programs.107 Students may also
discuss whether the antidiscrimination laws have been successful in
combating gender discrimination in the workplace by reference to
materials on different perspectives and information on the gender wage
gap, gender job segregation, and the glass ceiling.108
A particularly relevant issue for a law and socioeconomics course is
when markets should operate, or the appropriate domain of markets. I
discuss this issue by asking students whether markets should exist for
babies and the services of surrogate mothers.109 Students are able to
explore the likely consequences of having such markets. In addition,
they may address questions such as whether the essence of the
relationships between mothers and children are captured when law and
neoclassical economists use market terminology to describe these
relationships and whether the use of market rhetoric has the fearful
potential of changing the very nature of the relationships themselves.
I recommend that courses discuss families, markets, and the law
because students view these subjects as particularly relevant to their
lives.110 I begin with an exploration of historical perspectives on gender
roles as markets and social norms have changed.111 I also include
materials on the sources of power (including economic power) and
manifestations of power within marital relations.112 Students may
consider the following issues: How have laws and legal decisions
affected conceptions (or images) of women, and in addition, in what
ways have conceptions (or images) of women held by society at large
Moreover, how have
affected the law and legal decisions?113
105. See id.
106. See id. at ch. 7 (Discrimination).
107. See id.
108. See id. at chs. 7 (Discrimination), 9 (Families, Markets and the Law).
109. See id. at ch. 8 (The Domain of Markets: Markets for Babies and Surrogate
Mothers?).
110. See id. at ch. 9 (Families, Markets and the Law).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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perceptions of gender roles, images of women, and sexual mores and
practices changed national family policies, family law (divorce and child
custody law), and welfare law, and what are the economic and social
consequences of these changes?114
A law and socioeconomics course may also address whether the
workplace has accommodated families with two working parents and
single parents.115 Students may relate to this subject by considering
workplace changes that law firms have made.116 An important issue
raised is whether workplace practices are geared to the nature of the
work or are culturally determined, namely, based on a historical conception
of the full-time, ideal male worker with few home responsibilities.
Other relevant issues include the following: Are women and men
downshifting to accommodate children and more balanced lives? Are
mothers and fathers working longer hours? Do they have time for their
children? What are the values and practicalities facing fathers and
mothers at this point in history concerning competitive consumerism,
careerism, and living balanced lives?117
Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility issues arise
when families are considered. In this connection, a course may cover
the perspectives of progressive corporate scholars on stakeholder theory
and managerial accountability as they differ from those of conservative
contractarians, who claim that the corporation’s management should act
solely in the interests of shareholders.118 It may address the corporate
social responsibility debate and explore issues concerning the limitations
of legislation and markets to assure moral decisionmaking by
managers.119 Of course, Enron is of particular interest. In this regard,
attention may be given to the corporate culture at Enron and the factors
that contribute to an ethical corporate culture.120 In addition, a course
may consider problems in regulating the conduct of multinational
corporations by exploring the importance and limitations of international
human rights norms, internal corporate codes of conduct, and the work of
nongovernmental organizations in regulating the conduct of multinational
corporations, and by considering different perspectives on whether and
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at ch. 10 (Corporate Social Responsibility, Markets and the Law).
See id.
See id.
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how regulation may contribute to responsible corporate conduct.121
A law and socioeconomics course may also include classes on
globalization.122 The theory of comparative advantage and free market
theory as applied to today’s global marketplace and the critique of this
theory are relevant.123 Also important is a revisionist approach to
globalization that examines who benefits and who loses from specific
decisions to liberalize trade rather than assuming that all such decisions
are positive.124 Students may profitably explore the consequences for
legal regulation of a global marketplace and consider the impact of trade
and capital liberalization on U.S. workers and others.125 Finally, in the
context of the Asian financial crisis and the Tequila effect, students may
consider the dangers of instability resulting from capital liberalization
and the possible legal remedies that may diminish these dangers.126
In classes on emerging market economies students may explore the
philosophy behind the introduction of liberalized markets and
privatization in such nations as Russia, Czechoslovakia, and China.127
Subjects may include the shortcomings of the rapid introduction of
liberalized markets, the social preconditions for effective markets, and
the importance of pragmatism rather than free market ideology in
economic and social transformation.128 This discussion is most
instructive when it occurs in the context of comparing the neoclassical
and evolutionary-institutional economic approaches to liberalized markets
and privatization.129 In addition, teachers may wish to raise issues
concerning the interrelationships in developing nations between democracy,
ethnonationalism, and market capitalism.130
From the above description of the potential scope of a law and
socioeconomics course, it is obvious that there is not enough time in
such a course to cover all of these issues. This leaves the teacher
considerable flexibility. Teachers may wish to have students write
papers on some of the issues not covered in class.
There are also many subjects that a law and socioeconomics course
might address that are not covered in my materials, such as immigration
and the privatization of public utilities, prisons, and social security. In
my view, law and socioeconomic materials on additional subjects would
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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(1) compare neoclassical economic and heterodox economic
perspectives, (2) address the implications to law and public policy of
modifying neoclassical economic assumptions, such as the assumption
of rationality, and (3) consider the perspectives and findings of other
social science disciplines.
IV. THE APPROACH IN A SELECTED SUBJECT AREA
In this Part, I describe the approach I take in exploring one subject
area, which is discrimination. This discussion is intended to give a more
in-depth understanding of the teaching and materials used in a law and
socioeconomics course. I begin my classes on discrimination with a
statistical comparison of white and black families concerning income,
wealth, home ownership, and hours worked to capture the students’
attention. I then explore with them various economic discrimination
theories. I start with Gary Becker’s associational preference theory, that
is, his taste for discrimination theory and the general claim that markets
can deal effectively with discrimination.131 I separate out Becker’s
arguments concerning the economic consequences to minorities
depending on whether the discriminatory tastes come from employers,
coworkers, or consumers. I also include material from Richard Epstein’s
provocative book concerning the advantages of freedom of contract.132
I then turn to the statistical discrimination theory, which relaxes the
neoclassical assumption of perfect information and explains why some
minority members may receive wages below their marginal productivity,
which is referred to as economic discrimination. The statistical
discrimination theory suggests that discrimination by employers is
rational and profit maximizing because it serves as an effective means to
reduce the employers’ cost of acquiring information about individual
employees. The theory assumes that the discrimination is based on real
differences in productivity among groups. I include Epstein’s argument
that antidiscrimination laws hurt minorities, because employers cannot
offer them discriminatory wages to overcome the disadvantages that
statistical group assessments create for them. I further discuss the views
of economists, historians, and philosophers that raise questions and
provide information supporting and countering these arguments and
131.
132.

See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 2–3 (1957).
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 3, 4, 9 (1992).
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theories. For example, I cover the competing views concerning the
effect that statistical discrimination has on human capital investments by
minorities, Richard McAdams’s status-production model of race
discrimination,133 and arguments that discrimination will persist only if it
is based on real differences in productivity among groups.
I then turn to the perspectives of traditional institutional economists
who consider discrimination based on race, gender, and the like as
invidious distinctions and who view behavior as “mediated by cultural
interpretations, habituated behaviors and prescriptive social norms.
Institutionalists reject the neoclassical faith in market rationality, seeing
economic processes as ordered by systems of cultural belief and practice
that evolve historically.”134 This perspective presents the possibility that
employment decisions may reflect and reproduce discriminatory social
and cultural norms. I then briefly consider the cultural and historical
origins of stereotyping about minority groups and how the content of
social categories are transmitted among society members. I return to this
subject of stereotyping later in the materials.
Next, I include materials on the best known institutional theory, the
dual labor market theory, which focuses on the importance of internal
administrative structures. I also present criticisms of this approach. To
make this material meaningful to law students, I draw on David Wilkins
and Mitu Gulati’s excellent article, Why Are There So Few Black
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis.135 In this
article, the authors explain how high wages and partnership tournaments
adversely affect market pressures on law firms to hire and promote black
lawyers.136 They also discuss how lawyers are placed on dual tracks,
on a “training” or a “flatlining” track, and how this process affects the
opportunities and incentives of black lawyers.137 I also make passing
references to other relevant labor market theories.
I then consider the views of feminist economists, who take a number
of different approaches. Most feminist economists, however, contrary to
Becker’s theory, and like institutionalists, treat discrimination as a
systematic problem rather than a matter of individual “taste.”138 I also
133. Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044–45 (1995).
134. Ann L. Jennings, Economic Policies to Counter Discrimination, in THE ELGAR
COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 161, 162 (Geoffrey M.
Hodgson et al. eds., 1994).
135. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996).
136. Id. at 519–20.
137. Id. at 539–41.
138. Ann Jennings, Theories of Labour Markets, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO
FEMINIST ECONOMICS 511, 515–16 (Janice Peterson & Margaret Lewis eds., 1999).

30

DALLAS .DOC

[VOL. 41: 11, 2004]

9/17/2019 2:46 PM

Teaching Law and Socioeconomics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

introduce materials on gender theory that suggests that discrimination
affects not only hiring and promotion, but the very definition of
occupations and their values, thus shaping the division of labor as a
whole. I present information on gender job segregation, the wage gap,
and the glass ceiling. I explore the explanations that human capital
theory offers for these phenomena and various criticisms and findings
concerning these explanations.
After discussing the glass ceiling, I give an overview of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1965,139 which is intended to outlaw employers’
expression of tastes for discrimination and statistical discrimination in
employment decisions. I set forth the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,140 in which Ann Hopkins sued Price
Waterhouse for failing to promote her to partnership.141 The record
reflected gender stereotyping—her mentor at Price Waterhouse told her
she needed to wear make-up and jewelry and walk and dress more
femininely.142 I also include Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc.,143 which provides some protection for homosexuals from
discrimination resulting from their failure to meet gender stereotypes.144
I follow this material with information on implicit or unconscious
stereotyping from the psychological literature and draw on excellent law
review articles by Charles Lawrence145 and Linda Krieger146 to present
the psychoanalytic explanation for racism and the cognitive psychology
approach to discrimination. Concerning the latter approach, I include
materials relevant to employment and promotion decisions that show
how “[s]chemas serve essential heuristic functions in human
cognition,”147 which can result in the biasing of incoming information
and lead to predictable types of errors in social judgments. The
relevance of this psychological information is then explored in the
context of the Price Waterhouse case, drawing on an article by Susan
Fiske, a social psychologist, who testified in that case.148
139. 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000)).
140. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
141. Id. at 231–32.
142. Id. at 235.
143. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
144. See id. at 82.
145. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
146. Krieger, supra note 46.
147. Id. at 1200.
148. See Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
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I then turn to the implications for the law of implicit or unconscious
stereotyping. Should plaintiffs have to prove the intent to discriminate
in cases such as Price Waterhouse? What should plaintiffs have to
prove? Subjects explored include the recommendation of David
Oppenheimer concerning providing a cause of action for negligent
discrimination,149 other measures suggested by social psychologists for
combating implicit stereotyping, and the possibility of affirmative
action as a remedy. The arguments for and against affirmative action are
examined, including consideration of studies on stereotype threat.150
The students are brought back to Wilkins and Gulati’s article to discuss
affirmative action arguments in the context of law firms.151
Next, I raise the legal issue concerning which groups or classes of persons
should be covered by Title VII. Should homosexuals be included? How
about ugly or overweight persons? Evidence shows a negative correlation
between wages and obesity. What is the significance to this issue of the
halo effect, in which physical attractiveness is often considered to be
associated with other positive characteristics?152 I question whether the
determination of these issues is assisted by the rationales for determining
suspect classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment.153
In addition, I include material on the exception to Title VII, which
permits certain forms of discrimination on the basis of “bona fide”
occupational requirements.154 I ask the class the following question:
What is the appropriate role of consumer preferences in establishing a
bona fide occupational qualification, and does the standard applied by
courts in determining whether a bona fide occupational requirement
exists permit the perpetuation of societal stereotyping? Lastly, materials
are included that attempt to assess whether the antidiscrimination laws
have been effective.
This Part has reflected the approach that I take in all the materials I
use in my law and socioeconomics course and textbook. I consider
various schools of economic thought and the contributions of other
social sciences to our understanding of socioeconomic decisionmaking,
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049 (1991).
149. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 899 (1993).
150. See Claude M. Steele, Thin Ice: “Stereotype Threat” and Black College
Students, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1999, at 44.
151. See generally Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 135.
152. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCH. REV. 4, 9 (1995).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000).

32

DALLAS .DOC

[VOL. 41: 11, 2004]

9/17/2019 2:46 PM

Teaching Law and Socioeconomics
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

and explore the relevance of this material to various legal issues.
V. CONCLUSION
Law and socioeconomics courses expose students to alternative schools
of economic thought and other social science materials that are relevant to
law and public policy issues. In addition, through comparisons of
neoclassical and heterodox economic approaches, a law and socioeconomics
course provides students with a framework for identifying different
perspectives concerning the role of law, the role of economics in legal
decisionmaking, and methods for designing and evaluating laws and
public policies. I hope that the approach I take will catch on and that it
will encourage other teachers to follow a similar path.
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